Category Archives: Business

Neutrality Matters

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Net Neutrality CNN dot com

Image:  CNN.com

“WIRED”

“In a time when there are too few companies with too much power – we need net neutrality now more than ever.

Getting rid of Title II would lead to even more centralization, handing more power to the largest Internet companies while stifling competition and innovation.

Next month, Amazon, Netflix, and dozens of other companies and organizations will host a “day of action” aimed at saving net neutrality as we know it. The Federal Communications Commission, meanwhile, is on the verge of revoking its own authority to enforce net neutrality rules, and the country’s biggest telecommunications companies are cheering along. The future of the internet is on the line here, but it’s easy to be cynical about the conflict: What does it matter which set of giant corporations controls the internet?

Under the current net neutrality rules, broadband providers like Comcast and Charter, and wireless providers like AT&T and Verizon, can’t block or slow down your access to lawful content, nor can they create so-called “fast lanes” for content providers who are willing to pay extra. In other words, your internet provider can’t slow your Amazon Prime Video stream to a crawl so you’ll keep your Comcast cable plan, and your mobile carrier can’t stop you from using Microsoft’s Skype instead of your own Verizon cell phone minutes.

If the Trump administration gets its way and abolishes net neutrality, those broadband providers could privilege some content providers over others (for a price, of course). The broadband industry says it supports net neutrality in theory but opposes the FCC’s reclassification of internet providers as utility-like “Title II” providers, and that consumers have nothing to worry about. But it’s hard not to worry given that without Title II classification, the FCC wouldn’t actually be able to enforce its net neutrality rules. It might be less alarming if the internet were a level playing field with free and fair competition. But it’s not. At all.

If you want to search for anything online, you’ve got to go through Google or maybe Microsoft’s Bing. The updates your Facebook friends share are filtered through the company’s algorithms. The mobile apps you can find in your phone’s app store are selected by either Apple or Google. If you’re like most online shoppers, you’re mostly buying products sold by Amazon and its partners. Even with the current net neutrality laws there’s not enough competition—without them, there will be even less, which could stifle the growth and innovation that fuels the digital economy.

Fast lanes or other types of network discrimination could have a big impact on the countless independent websites and apps that already exist, many of which would have to cough up extra money to compete with the bigger competitors to reach audiences. Consider the examples of Netflix, Skype, and YouTube, all of which came of age during the mid-2000s when the FCC’s first net neutrality rules were in place. Had broadband providers been able to block videos streaming and internet-based phone calls in the early days, these companies may have seen their growth blocked by larger companies with deeper pockets. Instead, net neutrality rules allowed them to find their audiences and become the giants they are today, and without net neutrality, they could even potentially become the very start-up-killers that would’ve slowed or stopped their own earlier growth. Getting rid of net neutrality all but ensures that the next generation of internet companies won’t be able to compete with the internet giants.

The end of net neutrality could also have ranging implications for consumers. Amazon, Netflix, YouTube, and a handful of other services may dominate the online video market, but without net neutrality, broadband providers might try to make it more expensive to access popular streaming sites in an attempt to keep customers paying for expensive television packages. “[Net neutrality] protects consumers from having the cost of internet go up because they have to pay for fast lane tolls,” says Chris Lewis, vice president of the advocacy group Public Knowledge.

Lewis also points out that there are a few other consumer friendly protections in the FCC’s net neutrality rules. For example, the FCC rules require internet service providers to disclose information about the speed of their services, helping you find out whether you’re getting your money’s worth. They also force broadband providers to allow you to connect any device you like to your internet connection, so that your provider can’t force you to use a specific type of WiFi router, or tell you which Internet of Things gadgets you can or can’t use.

“The Internet is as awesome and diverse as it is thanks to the basic guiding principle of net neutrality,” says Evan Greer, campaign director for Fight for the Future, one of the main organizers of the net neutrality day of action, which will take place on July 12 and try to raise awareness about net neutrality across the web.”

https://www.wired.com/story/why-net-neutrality-matters-even-in-the-age-of-oligopoly/

Half of Industrial Control Systems Suffered Cyber Attack Last Year

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Cyber Attacks

The National Institute of Standards and Technology’s industrial control security testbed. (Photo Credit: NIST)

“FIFTH DOMAIN CYBER”

“Data gathered comes from 359 industrial cyber security practitioners in 21 countries that completed online surveys between February 2017 and April 2017.

One-in-five respondents experienced two incidents within the 12-month window.

Threats to industrial control systems are becoming increasingly widespread, according to a new survey from cyber security firm Kaspersky Lab and Business Advantage that found over half of the companies sampled reporting at least one cyberattack in the last 12 months.

The top observed threat remains conventional malware, which played a part in 53 percent of actual incidents, followed by targeted attacks, such as spear phishing to more sophisticated advanced persistent threats. The top perceived threats are  third-party supply chain/partners and sabotage/intentional damage from other external sources.

This has led three-in-four companies to expect a cyber attack to happen to them, though 83 percent feel prepared to combat an incident.

Organizations might not be as ready as they believe themselves to be, however, considering the fact that the anti-malware solutions already implemented by 67 percent of respondents still allowed for so many incidents.

Increasing the frequency of issuing patches/updates could contribute to protection from incidents like the WannaCry pandemic, but the increased attack surface and access granted to external parties by growing enterprises complicates matters.

Therefore, risk management is being recognized as a growing priority, but finding properly trained staff and reliable external partners to implement cyber security tops the challenges of companies that acknowledge financial loss is shown to decrease in organizations that have security awareness programs for staff, contractors and partners.

Looking at the survey’s findings, the top risk factors appear to be the access of external parties, a lack of compliance with industry/government regulations and the use of wireless connections. This has led companies to express support for some level of mandatory reporting and governance to help bring about more transparency to help develop frameworks to address the risks.

Some factors that appear to help mitigate threats include documented cybersecurity programs being set in place; regular security assessments/audits being conducted; vulnerability scans and patch deployments happening biweekly at minimum; unidirectional gateways being installed between control systems and the rest of the network; anti-malware solutions being installed for industrial endpoints; industrial anomaly detection tools, intrusion detection and intrusion prevention tools being used; and staff and contractors being given regular security awareness training.”

The entire survey can be accessed by filling in a form on the Kaspersky blog.

Are You Prepared for a Contract Cancellation?

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nbmcwdot com 31949-Termination-of-Contract

Image:  nbmcwd.com

 

“WASHINGTON TECHNOLOGY”  By Darrell Hineman, Brian Courtney

“The possibility of a contract termination should be incorporated into every government contractor’s business continuity plan.

Implementing safeguards and procedures designed to mitigate the risk of a termination will limit the impact it has on your organization’s operations.

Preparing for the possibility of a contract termination is a defensive strategy that contractors should undertake now. Here are three key steps you should consider immediately:

  1. Plan ahead. Never consider your contract as “termination-proof.”
  2. Fully understand the contract termination process
  3. Learn how to calculate and submit your Request for Equitable Adjustment or settlement proposal.

The possibility of a contract termination should be incorporated into every government contractor’s business continuity plan. Implementing safeguards and procedures designed to mitigate the risk of a termination will limit the impact it has on your organization’s operations. Ask yourself, “Does my organization have procedures in place to deal with cure notices, customer complaints, and quality issues? What about monitoring subcontractors?”

If you are still reading this article, you probably are not as well prepared for a contract termination as you should be. Most contract terminations have a root cause and are not solely due to the government no longer requiring the items or services.

Here are some common contract termination causes and how to prevent them:

Failure to immediately address government concerns

Whether a complaint or “suggestion” is received verbally or in writing from the government, there should be a process in place to respond immediately. Often, we hear from clients that their program personnel were in the process of addressing a government issue (but apparently not in real-time). Now, they are dealing with a cure notice for many items to be corrected in two weeks.

Incorporate the handling and response to government communications and complaints/concerns into your program management policy and procedures. All complaints/concerns should be documented and tracked from the initial problem to the eventual solutions.

Regular communication with the government is also critical in staying ahead of potential contract issues and preventing a termination. The contractor program manager should routinely relay project status to the government in writing – even if not required under the contract terms. We recommend weekly communications but, depending on the project, monthly communications may suffice.

Failure to evaluate change orders for potential effect on cost or schedule

Sometimes, trying to fully please the client can actually lead to a termination. A contractor has only 30 days from the date of receipt of a written order to assert its right to an adjustment. Often, accepting changes without evaluating the impact on scope, cost, and/or schedule can lead to project delays and cost overruns. These may ultimately result in missed delivery/performance dates.

As a preventative measure, create a standard procedure to evaluate the impact of any change request on the scope, cost, and/or schedule of a project. Share this required procedure with the customer: “Yes, we can make changes, but we first need to evaluate the scope, cost, and schedule to identify any project impacts.”

Subcontractor performance issues

Many contractors focus on complying with the requirement to issue subcontracts and neglect their associated responsibility for managing subcontractors under FAR 42.202(e)(2), Assignment of Contract Administration. Prime contractors often assume, without oversight or verification, that their subcontractors will meet prescribed performance and deliverable requirements.

When a subcontractor fails to deliver, the prime contractor is ultimately responsible for addressing the issue, or may face termination. Therefore, you should ensure that you flow down the proper terms and conditions to your subcontractors, including the prime contract termination clauses and deliverable dates.

Another step we recommend is to create a post-award subcontract administration procedure to address the risk. Ensure that adequate and comprehensive subcontractor oversight is built in to your procurement and project management processes. Any issue that can affect contract performance/delivery must be escalated quickly for resolution.

Bidding on unprofitable work

Today, when lowest price, technically acceptable typically beats out best value (though recent legislation directs more limited use of LPTA procurements), contractors often estimate their cost to fit the price they want to bid and what they think the government is willing to pay. Instead, you should be focusing on the actual cost required to address the government’s mission-stated requirements.

Even though you may know that the “price to win” is too low to perform the work adequately, the proposal development organization might not want to deviate from that winning number.

To avoid bidding on unprofitable work, you should develop a comprehensive estimating manual and system so that your estimated costs are based on real costs/prices currently in the marketplace. As part of this, build and encourage a corporate culture that incentivizes employees for more profitable work as opposed to contract wins exclusively.

As no contract is termination proof, the key is to always be prepared and have a defense strategy in place at all times.”

About the Authors

Darrell Hineman is the director of the government compliance group at the accounting, tax and advisory firm CohnReznick LLP. https://www.cohnreznick.com/industries/government-contracting

Brian Courtney is a senior manager at the accounting, tax and advisory firm CohnReznick LLP. https://www.cohnreznick.com/industries/government-contracting

https://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2017/06/09/insights-contractor-termination.aspx

 

For more information on the types of contract terminations, preparing for them and managing them, please see the article linked below:

http://www.smalltofeds.com/2011/08/federal-government-contract.html

GAO: “Late Means Late for Contract Proposals”

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Image: National Defense Magazine

“NATIONAL DEFENSE MAGAZINE” By By Julia Lippman and Jason Workmaster

“GAO’s opinion should serve as a warning to contractors that a late proposal will not be considered.

Especially with the use of electronic submission processes, a matter of seconds can be the difference between a timely and late proposal.

The Government Accountability Office on Feb. 27 reiterated its long standing rule that, when it comes to proposal submissions, “late” means “late.”

GAO addressed a protest filed by Tele-Consultants Inc. in connection with a request for proposals issued by Naval Sea Systems Command. TCI’s protest argued that its proposal was improperly rejected by the agency for being submitted after the deadline.

Under the request for proposals, the Navy sought support services for the Naval Undersea Warfare Center through the issuance of a task order to a small business holder of the SeaPort-e multiple award indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract. The solicitation was issued Sept. 28, 2016 and proposals were to be submitted electronically through the SeaPort-e portal by Nov. 8 at 2:00 p.m. eastern time. The solicitation required compliance with the proposal submission instructions outlined in the SeaPort-e multiple award contract and the SeaPort Vendor Portal User Guide.

In using the portal, contractors were required to designate an “authorized user” who could confirm the intent to engage in a legally binding action, such as submitting a proposal. When a contractor was ready to submit its proposal, its authorized user was required to use the “submit signed proposal” button. The portal would then generate a confirmation prompt that would require the user to confirm his or her intent to electronically sign and submit the proposal.

The portal was set up so that contractors could store their proposals on the contractor side of the portal prior to submitting their proposal.

The agency received three proposals by the deadline. TCI’s proposal was not among them. Rather, TCI’s proposal remained in its draft form on the contractor side of the portal because it had not engaged the submit button.

Based on a review of the server logs, the agency determined that TCI’s representatives had unsuccessfully tried to engage the button 23 and 34 seconds after the proposal deadline. TCI reached out to the contracting officer by phone and email stating that the proposal button had not allowed it to submit its proposal but that “TCI’s proposal was timely submitted and it was intended to be binding on TCI.”

TCI received an email that evening from the SeaPort-e portal that noted that, “[a]n event for which you created a draft proposal has closed without you completing the final submission process. As a result, the draft will not be considered.” There was no indication that the portal had experienced any technical malfunction that would have prevented TCI from timely submitting its proposal.

TCI argued that its proposal should not have been rejected because, even though it did not receive notice that its proposal was timely submitted, its proposal was, in fact, submitted on time. Additionally, TCI argued that, even if its proposal was late, it was in the government’s control and was, thus, subject to the exception set forth in FAR 15.208. Under FAR 15.208, proposals that are submitted after the deadline are late unless, among other exceptions, there is evidence that the proposal “was received at the government installation designated for receipt of proposals and was under the government’s control prior to the time set for receipt of proposals[.]”

TCI argued that the archival lock on proposal files was acceptable evidence to establish that its proposal was received at the government installation designated for receipt of proposals and was under the government’s control prior to the time set for receipt of proposals.

The agency responded that TCI’s failure to engage the button meant that TCI had failed to submit its proposal either on time or after the deadline. The agency explained that proposals were not added to the government side of the portal until the submit button was selected. Thus, TCI’s proposal was never received by the government or under the government’s control. The agency also proffered that it could not know if TCI meant to be legally bound by its proposal in light of its failure to engage the button.

Although noting that it was not clear that FAR 15.208 even applied to this FAR Part 16 procurement, GAO nevertheless agreed with the agency and found that TCI failed to submit its proposal. GAO reiterated the well-established rule that an offeror is responsible for delivering its proposal to the designated place by the designated time and that an agency is not required to consider a proposal when there is no evidence that it was “actually received” by the agency.

GAO found that there was no evidence that TCI had actually submitted its proposal to the agency as the electronic submission of a legally binding offer was not completed. TCI did not dispute that it tried to use the submit button after the 2:00 p.m. EST deadline. And TCI never engaged the button even though it tried to do so. TCI’s failure to engage the button meant that it had never submitted a legally binding proposal. GAO concluded that it had “no basis to challenge the agency’s decision that it had not received, and could not consider, TCI’s draft proposal.”

Contractors should take extra care when submitting a proposal electronically to ensure that all proper submittal steps for the submission of a legally binding proposal have been completed well before a proposal deadline.

Additionally, a proposal stored on a government portal may not be sufficient to establish it was in the government’s control.”

Jason N. Workmaster is of counsel and Julia Lippman is an associate in the government contracts practice at Covington & Burling LLP.

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/6/15/late-means-late-for-contract-proposals

 

 

Pentagon Declares Lockheed F-35 “Too Big to Fail”

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F-35 Too Big to Fail

(Photo Credit: Staff Sgt. Staci Miller/US Air Force)

“DEFENSE NEWS” By Michael P. Hughes

“Officially begun in 2001, with roots extending back to the late 1980s, the F-35 program is nearly a decade behind schedule, and has  failed to meet many of its original design requirements.

It’s also become the most expensive defense program in world history, at about $1.5 trillion before the fighter is  phased out in 2070.

The F-35 was billed as a fighter jet that could do almost everything the U.S. military desired, serving the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy — and even Britain’s Royal Air Force and Royal Navy — all in one aircraft design. It’s supposed to replace and improve upon several current — and aging — aircraft types with widely different missions. It’s marketed as a cost-effective, powerful multi-role fighter airplane significantly better than anything potential adversaries could build in the next two decades. But it’s turned out to be none of those things.

The unit cost per airplane, above $100 million, is roughly twice what was promised early on. Even after U.S. President Donald Trump lambasted the cost of the program in February, the price per plane dropped just $7 million — less than 7 percent.

And yet, the U.S. is still throwing huge sums of money at the project. Essentially, the Pentagon has declared the F-35 “ too big to fail.” As a retired member of the U.S. Air Force and current university professor of finance who has been involved in and studied military aviation and acquisitions, I find the F-35 to be one of the greatest boondoggles in recent military purchasing history.

Forget what’s already spent

The Pentagon is trying to argue that just because taxpayers have flushed more than $100 billion down the proverbial toilet so far, we must continue to throw billions more down that same toilet. That violates the most elementary financial principles of capital budgeting, which is the method companies and governments use to decide on investments. So-called sunk costs, the money already paid on a project, should never be a factor in investment decisions. Rather, spending should be based on how it will add value in the future.

Keeping the F-35 program alive is not only a gross waste in itself: Its funding could be spent on defense programs that are really useful and needed for national defense, such as  anti-drone systems to defend U.S. troops.

Part of the enormous cost has come as a result of an effort to share aircraft design and replacement parts across different branches of the military. In 2013, a study by the think tank Rand found that it would have been cheaper if the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy had simply  designed and developed separate and more specialized aircraft to meet their specific operational requirements.

Not living up to top billing

The company building the F-35 has made grand claims. Lockheed Martin said the plane would be far better than current aircraft — “four times more effective” in air-to-air combat, “eight times more effective” in air-to-ground combat and “three times more effective” in recognizing and suppressing an enemy’s air defenses. It would, in fact, be “ second only to the F-22 in air superiority.” In addition, the F-35 was to have better range and require less logistics support than current military aircraft. The Pentagon is still calling the F-35 “ the most affordable, lethal, supportable, and survivable aircraft ever to be used.”

But that’s not how the plane has turned out. In January 2015, mock combat testing pitted the F-35 against an F-16, one of the fighters it is slated to replace. The F-35A was flown “clean” with empty weapon bays and without any drag-inducing and heavy, externally mounted weapons or fuel tanks. The F-16D, a heavier and somewhat less capable training version of the mainstay F-16C, was further encumbered with two 370-gallon external wing-mounted fuel tanks.

In spite of its significant advantages, the F-35A’s test pilot noted that the F-35A was less maneuverable and markedly inferior to the F-16D in a visual-range dogfight.

Stealth over power

One key reason the F-35 doesn’t possess the world-beating air-to-air prowess promised, and is likely not even adequate when compared with its current potential adversaries, is that it was designed first and foremost to be a stealthy airplane. This requirement has taken precedence over maneuverability, and likely above its overall air-to-air lethality. The Pentagon and especially the Air Force seem to be relying almost exclusively on the F-35’s stealth capabilities to succeed at its missions.

Like the F-117 and F-22, the F-35’s stealth capability greatly reduces, but does not eliminate, its radar cross-section, the signal that radar receivers see bouncing back off an airplane. The plane looks smaller on radar — perhaps like a bird rather than a plane — but is not invisible. The F-35 is designed to be stealthy primarily in the X-band, the radar frequency range most commonly used for targeting in air-to-air combat.

In other radar frequencies, the F-35 is not so stealthy, making it vulnerable to being tracked and shot down using current — and even obsolete — weapons. As far back as 1999 the same type of stealth technology was not able to prevent a U.S. Air Force F-117 flying over Kosovo from being located, tracked and shot down using an outdated Soviet radar and surface-to-air missile system. In the nearly two decades since, that incident has been studied in depth not only by the U.S., but also by potential adversaries seeking weaknesses in passive radar stealth aircraft.

Of course, radar is not the only way to locate and target an aircraft. One can also use an aircraft’s infrared emissions, which are created by friction-generated heat as it flies through the air, along with its hot engines. Several nations, particularly the Russians, have excellent passive infrared search and tracking systems that can locate and target enemy aircraft with great precision — sometimes using lasers to measure exact distances, but without needing radar.

It’s also very common in air-to-air battles for opposing planes to come close enough that their pilots can see each other. The F-35 is as visible as any other aircraft its size.

Analysts weigh in

Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon say the F-35’s superiority over its rivals lies in its ability to remain undetected, giving it “ first look, first shot, first kill.” Hugh Harkins, a highly respected author on military combat aircraft, called that claim “a marketing and publicity gimmick” in his book on Russia’s Sukhoi Su-35S, a potential opponent of the F-35. “In real terms an aircraft in the class of the F-35 cannot compete with the Su-35S for out and out performance such as speed, climb, altitude, and maneuverability,” he wrote.

Other critics have been even harsher. Pierre Sprey, a co-founding member of the so-called fighter mafia at the Pentagon and a co-designer of the F-16, calls the F-35 “inherently a terrible airplane” that is the product of “an exceptionally dumb piece of Air Force PR spin.” He has said the F-35 would likely lose a close-in combat encounter to a well-flown MiG-21, a 1950s Soviet fighter design. Robert Dorr, an Air Force veteran, career diplomat and military air combat historian, wrote in his book “Air Power Abandoned”: “The F-35 demonstrates repeatedly that it can’t live up to promises made for it. … It’s that bad.”

How did we get here?

How did the F-35 go from its conception as the most technologically advanced, do-it-all military aircraft in the world to a virtual turkey? Over the decades-long effort to meet a real military need for better aircraft, the F-35 program is the result of the merging or combination of several other separate and diverse projects into a set of requirements for an airplane that is trying to be everything to everybody.

In combat, the difference between winning and losing is often not very great. With second place all too often meaning death, the Pentagon seeks to provide warriors with the best possible equipment. The best tools are those that are tailor-made to address specific missions and types of combat. Seeking to accomplish more tasks with less money, defense planners looked for ways to economize.

For a fighter airplane, funding decisions become a balancing act of procuring not just the best aircraft possible, but enough of them to make an effective force. This has lead to the creation of so-called multi-role fighter aircraft, capable both in air-to-air combat and against ground targets. Where trade-offs have to happen, designers of most multi-role fighters emphasize aerial combat strength, reducing air-to-ground capabilities. With the F-35, it appears designers created an airplane that doesn’t do either mission exceptionally well. They have made the plane an inelegant jack-of-all-trades, but master of none — at great expense, both in the past and, apparently,  well into the future.

I believe the F-35 program should be immediately canceled; the technologies and systems developed for it should be used in more up-to-date and cost-effective aircraft designs. Specifically, the F-35 should be replaced with a series of new designs targeted toward the specific mission requirements of the individual branches of the armed forces, in lieu of a single aircraft design trying to be everything to everyone.”

http://www.defensenews.com/articles/what-went-wrong-with-lockheeds-f-35-commentary

This article was originally published on The Conversation .

About the Author

Image result for Michael P. Hughes is a professor of finance at Francis Marion University.

Michael P. Hughes is a professor of finance at Francis Marion University. He served more than 21 years in the U.S. Air Force. During that time, he spent more than 14 years in nuclear treaty monitoring and related activities, while the initial 7 years were in the aircraft maintenance and engineering (propulsion) arena with F-4 and F-15 aircraft.

http://departments.fmarion.edu/business/hughes-michael-p.html

The US Military’s Iran Connection?

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Military and IRAN

(Photo: KGL Logistics logo, Iran rials by Serova / Flickr)

“THE PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT”

“The chairman of a key US military contractor in the Middle East was recently charged with multiple felonies in a major fraud, money laundering, and public corruption scheme.

Fraud and money laundering charges are only the latest in a string of KGL controversies in recent years.

There have been accusations of business ties to Iran in violation of US sanctions, and of systematic leaking of sealed and privileged federal court documents and other sensitive material to KGL’s Washington lawyers by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the DoD component that oversees KGL’s US military contracts.

According to court papers in Kuwait, where the charges were filed, misappropriated investor money so far totals more than $160 million, a figure that could go higher, the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) has learned. The contractor, Kuwait and Gulf Link Transport, better known as KGL, is a publicly traded conglomerate with hundreds of millions of dollars in US military contracts. The criminal charges, together with other court documents and unreported revelations made by former executives of a KGL affiliate in a US lawsuit, involve KGL’s possible violation of US sanctions against Iran, and accusations of potentially illicit flows of cash from Russia, Iran, and Syria. Taken together, the allegations raise troubling questions about the American military’s heavy reliance on the firm.

The 2017 criminal indictment by Kuwaiti prosecutors points specifically to a KGL affiliate, called KGL Investments (KGLI), as the alleged nexus of fraud and money laundering inside company headquarters from 2007 to 2015.

Two former KGLI executives have also made related allegations in little-noticed 2013 sworn statements filed in a US lawsuit. One executive said he was told by his KGLI boss that Iran’s state-owned shipping company, sanctioned by the United States in 2008 as a nuclear proliferator, was “KGL’s vehicle to Iran and she further told me that…[it] made a lot of money for KGL.”

The executive also said, “Specifically, it appeared to me that KGLI was engaged in money laundering, and presenting false financial information to investors.”

A spokesperson for KGL told POGO that, “Notwithstanding the name, KGL Investments is neither owned nor controlled by any of the KGL group of companies. No KGL entity is a party to the legal proceedings in Kuwait. The Kuwait courts will address and resolve the disputed allegations.” KGL has long denied it has ever violated US sanctions in any way.

However, KGL Investments, KGL, and many of its subsidiaries are co-located in the same office building and directed, in part, by KGL’s just-indicted chairman, who is also a director of KGLI, according to court papers. The indictment says that a portion of the embezzled funds was channeled to KGL component companies.

Also targeted in the criminal complaint against KGL’s chairman is the Vice-Chairman of KGLI. Convictions could result in jail sentences. Court documents list victims of the alleged fraud as key government departments: Kuwait’s Public Institution for Social Security and its Ports Authority. The Ports Authority serves as a staging area for America’s ongoing military involvement in Iraq, and was indispensable to US Central Command (CENTCOM) in both the first and second Gulf Wars and occupation of Iraq.

According to an official in Kuwait, senior US military personnel at the American embassy and at Camp Arifjan, a large American base in Kuwait, were officially informed of the criminal indictment, and received written copies of the details. This was done, the official said, because the indictment targets executives related to a major US military contractor, allegedly involved in stealing from important Kuwaiti institutions. In a separate dispute, the Ports Authority recently banned KGL from operating in the port. It remained unclear what action, if any, the US military might take in response. Spokespersons at CENTCOM, the Department of Defense, and the US Army’s Contracting Command all declined to comment.

What Happens Next?

Further revelations about KGL or its subsidiaries, or a conviction of one or both of the indicted executives, could call into question the conglomerate’s grip on sizable US military contracts, and its eligibility to receive future awards. Beyond the large contracts it already has, KGL is currently in line for a sizable share of the new so-called Heavy Lift VIII (HL8), a $200 million transportation-services deal that the US military could assign by August. But there is the possibility the award could run afoul of federal contracting rules, which require ethical conduct and the avoidance of serious crimes.

According to contracting rules, officially known as the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR): “Purchases shall be made from, and contracts shall be awarded to, responsible prospective contractors only.” The FAR goes on to specify that, “… To be determined responsible, a prospective contractor must … have a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics.” The regulation notes that contractors may be subject to debarment, suspension, or ineligibility if they are convicted or face a civil judgment for fraud, embezzlement, or “any other offense indicating a lack of business integrity or business honesty that seriously and directly affects the present responsibility of a Government contractor or subcontractor.”

In December, the Iran Sanctions Act was extended by 10 years on a 99-0 vote in the Senate, and a 419-1 vote in the House of Representations. The law states that the federal government “shall terminate a contract with such person or debar or suspend such person from eligibility for Federal contracts for a period of not less than 2 years” if they are found to have falsely certified to be in compliance with US sanctions against Iran.

KGL has repeatedly said it complied with provisions of the FAR.

A Hearing in Court

The criminal charges against KGL executives are the result of a four-year probe by Kuwait’s national security police. A court hearing on the matter in Kuwait was held on May 21, and another is scheduled for June 11. Among other records, POGO obtained a 21-page copy of a charge sheet dated May 9, 2017 (in Arabic).

The document names three defendants. Saed Dashti, 61, is chairman of KGL. Maria [Marsha] Lazareva, 44, is Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of KGLI, where Saed Dashti also serves as a director. A third defendant, Mohamed Al-Asfour, 71, is a senior public official: the executive vice-chairman of Kuwait’s Ports Authority.

Documents describe Lazareva as a Russian national. She was educated at the Wharton business school and public records associate her with real estate ownership in the Philadelphia area. According to news accounts, she showed up in court for the May 21 hearing, protesting her innocence.

The indictment says Dashti and Lazareva transferred large sums of investors’ money to their own private accounts and to a variety of KGL subsidiaries or related companies between 2007 and 2015. They did this, court documents say, partly using a network of financial institutions including the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) and one of its branches in the Cayman Islands. The bank also has branches in the United States, Kuwait, Asia, and other parts of the world. It’s unclear whether any of the allegedly embezzled funds passed at some point through the American financial system, which could trigger a US investigation.

A civil lawsuit involving KGL in Pennsylvania has brought to light accusations that could bear directly on the alleged fraud and money laundering scheme in Kuwait. The lawsuit, brought by KGL, charges the firm’s principal competitor, Agility Public Warehousing Co., with defaming KGL’s reputation by falsely claiming it had ties to Iran.

Saed Dashti and Marsha Lazareva

Saed Dashti and Marsha Lazareva (Source: Instagram)

 

Testimony in the Pennsylvania case—which is ongoing—includes declarations sworn in 2013 by a pair of former executives of KGL Investments, as part of Agility’s defense. Both said Dashti and Lazareva misinformed investors about KGLI’s financial condition, and one of the executives reported they had made repeated trips to Russia, Iran, and Syria in an apparent attempt to shore up KGLI’s faltering finances.

The two former KGLI executives testified that Dashti and Lazareva occupied offices on the same floors and hallways at KGL’s headquarters in Kuwait along with other subsidiaries.

One of the executives who testified, Ahmed Mabrouk, is an American citizen currently employed in the US financial industry. Court records identify him as former KGLI Vice-President Investments, a job where he testified he spent 18 months in 2008 and 2009 (a period covered by the 2017 criminal indictment) helping to analyze KGLI’s so-called “Port Fund,” an entity that invested in marine facilities around the Middle East and elsewhere. Under oath, Mabrouk said:

“Ms. Lazareva described to me the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) as KGL’s vehicle to Iran and she further told me that IRISL made a lot of money for KGL. When I was employed at KGLI, I observed Ms. Lazareva in her office reviewing documents related to IRISL, which bore the logo of IRISL, as well as the Iranian emblem.”

The declaration of Mabrouk, who could not be reached for comment, did not include documentary or other evidence to support his statement.

The United States, European Union (EU), and United Nations (UN) have all imposed sanctions on IRISL, Iran’s state-owned shipping company and a former joint-venture partner with KGL. Referring to US sanctions, applied in 2008, then-Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey explained:

“Not only does IRISL facilitate the transport of cargo for U.N. designated proliferators, it also falsifies documents and uses deceptive schemes to shroud its involvement in illicit commerce. IRISL’s actions are part of a broader pattern of deception and fabrication that Iran uses to advance its nuclear and missile programs.”

In his declaration, Mabrouk said, “I reviewed KGLI’s internal financial statements and observed that KGLI consistently had a negative cash flow.” Mabrouk also testified that he looked at “…financial statements that had been provided to investors. The financial statements provided to investors consistently, and in bad faith, misrepresented financial data regarding KGLI and its portfolio companies’ actual financial condition.”

Concern about KGLI’s financial condition, according to Mabrouk, caused KGLI’s banks to stop lending it money, creating a cash squeeze. And that led to “fundraising” trips by Dashti and Lazareva, he said:

“I understood that Ms. Lazareva and Saeeed (sic) Dashti took a number of trips on private planes to, among other places, Iran, Syria and Russia. Following each trip, I observed in KGLI’s internal financial statements an influx of funds into KGLI’s accounts. Ms. Lazareva told me and others at KGLI that these trips were for ‘fundraising;’ however, to my knowledge, such fundraising was not tied to any formalized investment process.”

Mabrouk did not say what, if anything, KGL Investments did in exchange for the money it allegedly received, or that he knew specifically that inflows had come from Iran, Syria, and Russia, even though he said the pair had travelled there.

Mabrouk did specify that Lazareva at one point asked him to travel to Syria to “review a potential investment in a port,” but he refused because that country was under US sanctions. Because Mabrouk also holds an Egyptian passport, he said Lazareva told him to use that travel document instead of an American passport. When he refused a second time, it set off a chain of events which, he said, led to his departure from the company.

Another KGLI executive also offered testimony in the same Pennsylvania court case. Wael Salam, an American citizen who worked for KGLI both in Kuwait and in Atlanta, said he was the firm’s Chief Investment Officer. He said both Dashti and Lazareva were directly and deeply involved in decision-making at the firm. He also reported that KGL funded KGLI with money from its subsidiaries as well as seeking contributions from outside investors.

Salam said that, from his perspective as an insider at the company, making profits did not appear to be KGLI’s principal goal, at least given its decision to sink its money and assets from its “Port Fund” into a variety of failing or near-bankrupt facilities in Egypt, Pakistan, and other countries.

Four years before the criminal indictments in Kuwait, Salam testified that he wanted to leave KGLI “…because I believed it was engaging in illicit activities … Specifically, it appeared to me that KGLI was engaged in money laundering, and presenting false financial information to investors.” His statements also show that Salam was trying to raise money to start his own investment fund after he left KGLI, which the company cited as one of the grounds for his dismissal. He could not be reached for comment.

Salam said Lazareva asked him on multiple occasions to visit Iran, sometimes without explanation and at other times to evaluate a port investment. When he refused because Iran was under US sanctions, she suggested that he, too, use his Egyptian passport. He again refused to go and, following a series of disputes and alleged high-pressure tactics by the company, was fired.

A KGL representative declined to comment to POGO on the testimony of Mabrouk or Salam.

More Ties to Iran

The Pennsylvania court case recently provided additional information about KGL’s relationship with Iran, a controversy that stretches back into the Obama Administration. As evidence emerged indicating possible sanctions violations by KGL in its joint ownership of ships with IRISL, Ashton Carter, then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics and later Secretary of Defense, wrote to US lawmakers who had inquired about the situation.

In letters to Senators Claire McCaskill, Robert Menendez, Mark Kirk, Robert Bennett, and others in 2011, Carter wrote that DoD could find “no substantial information” that KGL had continuing ties to Iran that would prevent it from holding US military contracts. By that time, the company had publicly announced its decision to end all business dealings with Iran in compliance with US law.

Since then, however, as part of legal discovery in the Pennsylvania court case, KGL has divulged emails and documents, and offered testimony from one of its former executives that appear to show it did have business with IRISL—at a time when Under Secretary Carter was telling Congress just the opposite. At least that is the argument set forth in an extensively documented summary of KGL’s own internal records filed by KGL’s adversary in the Pennsylvania case. Among other things, the summary cites those KGL records showing that its joint venture with IRISL made “at least 63 financial transactions” with the Iranian shipper after US sanctions had been imposed. In another example from the summary, a former KGL executive, Allan Rosenberg, gave the court a statement describing how he set up a “ghost structure” email system that resulted in the concealment of KGL’s continuing business with the Iranian-owned company.

A KGL spokesperson declined to comment on the summary or on Rosenberg’s statement.

Airplane Parts for Iran?

In May last year, Fuad Dashti, a brother of the recently indicted Saed Dashti—both members of the wealthy Kuwaiti family that controls KGL—was arrested at San Francisco International Airport. He was charged with involvement in illegally selling aircraft parts to Iran, according to a senior US official, and brought to Washington, DC, apparently for questioning by the FBI. One official at the time described him as, “singing like a bird” while in US custody. Fuad Dashti has since been allowed to leave the United States and was photographed some months ago in Doha, Qatar. At the time of his arrest, a KGL spokesman told POGO that “the alleged conduct [of Fuad Dashti] does not involve KGL or any of its affiliates and that Mr. Fuad Dashti was not acting as a KGL employee or representative.”

However, Fuad Dashti maintains ongoing financial ties to KGL, and has been listed as a top executive and part owner of National Cleaning Company, which is partly owned by KGL. According to the recent indictment in Kuwait, Saed Dashti also owns a share of National Cleaning, though it is unclear whether misappropriated funds were diverted to the company. There was no reply to POGO’s repeated attempts to reach Fuad Dashti, including a message left at a California house where he is listed as owner.

Key Questions Remain

The criminal indictment of KGL’s chairman adds to a growing roster of unresolved issues swirling around the company and its role as a contractor with hundreds of millions of dollars in business with the US military. Questions surrounding the company’s possible financial ties to Iran, and even Syria and Russia, raise national security concerns at a time when those countries are actively engaged in confronting American interests.

America’s federal acquisition regulations require ethical conduct from companies and their leaders. The large body of evidence in Kuwait’s extensively documented fraud and money laundering case raises doubts whether that requirement is being met.

So, too, does the arrest of Fuad Dashti, long a key figure in KGL’s controlling dynasty, on charges of commercial dealings with Iran. Yet the US government has made virtually no public statements about the matter. The fact that KGL, as long ago as 2011 and perhaps earlier, has been the focus of a probe led by the FBI into its ties with Iran only adds to the doubts. Again, no result of that investigation has ever been made public. And the same is true of the US official response to a well-documented pattern of leaks to KGL’s Washington lawyers by the Defense Logistics Agency. Senior US officials have told POGO that the DoD’s Office of General Counsel and its Defense Criminal Investigative Service have looked at or been made aware of the matter. Yet neither has made a public statement about the issues.

Indeed, years of requests for information about KGL from agencies ranging from DoD to the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control have been met with incomplete answers and, on occasion, with apparently inaccurate information. Given that result, Congress needs to clear up what is going on with KGL and its huge government contracts, because federal agencies appear unable or unwilling to shed light on the issue, or credibly resolve it.

Given the new criminal charges lodged against KGL’s chairman, the American public needs to know whether the company is a responsible and deserving recipient of US taxpayer funds. To find out, Congress should look into what the FBI and other agencies have learned after years of investigating the company’s conduct, and inform the public of what it learns.

Of course KGL is not the only logistics contractor the US military could rely on. Its principal competitor, and one of the largest single US contractors in the Iraq war, is Agility Public Warehousing Company. Yet Agility, too, has faced its share legal problems: the Department of Justice recently settled criminal, civil, and administrative charges against it. In the criminal case, which began in 2009, DOJ sought hundreds of millions of dollars in compensation for alleged overcharging.  In the end, Agility was only required to “pay a maximum of $551…in restitution.” In the civil case, the company agreed to pay $95 million, ending its suspension and allowing it to bid once again on US government contracts.

Taken together, Agility’s recently resolved legal problems and the new criminal charges against KGL’s chairman highlight the need for Congress and the Defense Department to reevaluate a contracting framework that has made America’s military the captive of two giant companies in one of the most strategic parts of the globe, an area where US forces cannot operate without extensive logistical support. As an alternative to this dysfunctional system, Congress and the Defense Department should examine how to foster more competition by explicitly encouraging the Pentagon to make deals with a wider variety of market participants.”

http://www.pogo.org/our-work/articles/2017/us-top-militarys-iran-contracting.html

 

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) To Offer Data to Industry for Partnerships

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NGA Federal News Radio

NGA Headquarters – Image:  “Federal News Radio”

“BREAKING DEFENSE”

“The idea: offer companies chunks of the “wonderland” of unclassified NGA data so they can use them to build new products or to test algorithms key to their products.

It’s a bold and rare move by a large and largely secretive government agency.

The top two leaders of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, Robert Cardillo and Susan Gordon, met with Anthony Vinci, now NGA’s director of plans and programs, to discuss ways to get more value from the agency’s incredibly valuable pools of data.

Using The Economist‘s description of data as the oil of today — the most valuable commodity in our economy — Vinci argued the agency must deploy it and help pay the American people back for the investment they have made in building the agency. If data is the new oil, Vinci said companies should “turn it into plastic,” adding value.

Cardillo told reporters would NGA would create a B corporation — in effect a non-profit government company — and hire an outsider to run it.

This, I think it’s fair to say, is not a slam dunk. Culturally, it will be challenging, Vinci admitted. “It’s straightforward, but it sort of breaks every rule we have in the IC (Intelligence Community).” The IC doesn’t share data and it doesn’t partner with outsiders, except for allied and friendly governments when needed.

This process may sidestep the whole process of generating a requirement for an intelligence system. “I don’t think that’s how problems can be solved any more,” Vinci said. The current system, which can be circumvented if an urgent need exists, is generally slow and restrictive, one that the Pentagon and the IC are increasingly trying to amend.

I spoke with three senior industry officials who listened to Vinci’s presentation and they were hopeful but cautious. All three said they thought the new effort could yield unexpected and useful returns on taxpayer’s investments in the data.

The biggest obstacle may be Congress. Although NGA would not be making money from the data sharing and it would not be releasing any data that could help our enemies, they would be sharing a government resource which voting taxpayers paid for and over which lawmakers have oversight. Whether the products resulting from the data would be licensed back to NGA, or allowed to generate profits for companies is all still to be determined.

“That’s part of what were trying to figure out Vinci told me,: “taxpayers paid for this data and how can we get that value back to them.”

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/06/nga-to-offer-data-to-industry-for-partnerships/

 

Big Industry Winners in the Saudi Weapons Offer

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SAUDI-DEFENCE

(Photo Credit: FAYEZ NURELDINE/AFP/Getty Images)

“DEFENSE NEWS”

“The big winner, at least on the platform side, is Lockheed Martin, with an estimated $29.1 billion in potential sales.

That includes seven THAAD missile defense batteries ($13.5 billion), and three KC-130J and 20 C-130J aircraft ($5.8 billion), as well as four multi-mission surface combatant ships ($6 billion)

Now that details of the $110 billion arms package offered to Saudi Arabia are known, Lockheed Martin appears to be the clear winner among American defense firms.

First, a caveat: Defense News broke the details of the roughly $84 billion in unknown weapons offerings that President Donald Trump brought with him on a May 20 visit to the Kingdom. But by the nature of how foreign military sales are completed, dollar totals are best-guess estimations and likely represent the ceiling for what could be spent. The figures listed may well come down, and the timeframes listed may well change, based on final negotiations around the equipment.

the company’s Sikorsky arm also benefited, with two types of Black Hawk variants: 14 MH-60R Seahawk rotorcraft ($2 billion) and 30 UH-60 rescue helicopters ($1.8 billion). That could potentially grow. A statement from Lockheed, released after the visit to Saudi Arabia, claimed that a deal was being reached with Saudi company Taqnia to “support final assembly and completion of an estimated 150 S-70 Black Hawk utility helicopters for the Saudi government.”

A few other companies also fared well.

Boeing cashed in with an eight-year sustainment deal ($6.25 billion) for their F-15 aircraft, along with a relatively small $20 million deal to run a study on recapitalizing Saudi’s older fleet of F-15 C/D aircraft.

Raytheon’s big win came from an unknown type of enhancement for the Patriot missile system ($6.65 billion). BAE, meanwhile, hopes to bring in $3.7 billion worth of work on its Bradley vehicle, with a pair of contracts – one to modify 400 existing vehicles, and another to produce 213 new ones. (The company may also cash out on an order for 180 Howitzers, worth $1.5 billion.)

There is also a $2 billion order for an unknown number of Mk-VI patrol boats, produced by SAFE Boats International.

The previously unreported list includes roughly 104,000 air to surface weapons, including 27,000 GBU-38 designs ($1.24 billion, Boeing), 9,000 GBU-31v3 designs ($690 million, Boeing), 9,000 GBU-31v1 designs ($490 million, Boeing), 50,000 GBU-12 designs ($1.67 billion, Lockheed and Raytheon) and 9,000 GBU-10 designs ($370 million, Lockheed and Raytheon.)

Known unknowns
But there is a chance for more growth, based on a set of unspecified aircraft and satellite programs. The list includes $2 billion for a light air support aircraft, type and quantity to be decided later. It also includes another $2 billion for four new aircraft to replace the Kingdom’s Tactical Airborne Surveillance System, which serves a similar role to the U.S. Air Force JSTARS.

The light air support seems to have a fairly small list of options: either Textron with it’s AT-6 (or, perhaps, its Scorpion jet, still in search of a first customer) or the Embraer/Sierra Nevada team’s A-29 Super Tucano. Both the UAE and Jordan have ordered the A-29, so buying the Super Tucano would give the Kingdom commonality with two of its closest allies.

The wildcard may be the U.S. Air Force’s OA-X experiment, which is holding a flyoff between the Scorpion, AT-6 and A-29 this summer. In theory, the Air Force is looking at replacing the A-10 with one of the three planes, but the service has been careful to stress this summer’s action is more of a fact-finding exercise than a downselect. At the same time, if the USAF shows a preference for one of the jets, the Saudis may look in the same direction.

As to the TASS replacement, the first question is whether the Saudis look to glom onto the JSTARS recapitalization, which should be awarded sometime in fiscal year 2018. If so, Boeing, a Northrop Grumman/L-3/General Dynamics team and a Lockheed Martin/ Bombardier team would benefit here.

However, the TASS and JSTARS setups are somewhat different, and it may be the Saudis would look for a custom solution.

Meanwhile, the Kingdom has been offered a clutch of satellites, with as-yet-unknown designs: two “Remote Sensing Satellites” estimated at $800 million and two satellite communications & space based early warning systems estimated at $4 billion.

Given the focus on missile defense, the space based early warning systems could well be a derivative of Lockheed’s Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) missile defense satellite. If so, the U.S. may be able to seek an arrangement with the Kingdom on information sharing, which would widen the overall capability of the missile tracking system.

How quickly these contracts can be pushed through the system is an open question. Roman Schweizer, an analyst with Cowen Washington Research Group, wrote in a note to investors Friday that “precision munitions and missile defense remain top priorities for the Kingdom.”

“We think the elements of the package will probably go through as individual items, which could reduce opposition. We think some of the more easily defined items that have been either sold to Saudi before or to other countries could proceed quickly (such as THAAD, Patriot, precision munitions, helicopters, F-15, C-130Js, etc.),” he wrote.”

Army Colonel, Wife and Defense Contractor Accused – $20 Million Bribery and Kickback Scheme

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Gavel and law books

(Photo Credit: BrianAJackson/Getty Images via iStockphoto)

“ARMY TIMES”
“Col. Anthony Roper conspired with his wife and others to seek and accept bribes in exchange for rigging more than $20 million in Army contracts to individuals and companies, prosecutors said Thursday.

The scheme began in 2008 and lasted nearly a decade, prosecutors said.

Roper was stationed at Fort Gordon near Augusta, Georgia. His duties included oversight of the Army’s efforts to build and modernize its information and communication networks, an indictment said.

Roper, 55, is charged with conspiracy, bribery, obstruction and making false statements. He faces up to 85 years in prison if convicted.

The colonel’s wife, Audra Roper, 49, is charged with conspiracy, false statements and obstruction.
Dwayne Oswald Fulton, 58, is charged with conspiracy and obstruction. Fulton was an officer for “a large defense contracting company.” The firm is not named in the court records.

Audra Roper operated Quadar Group, which prosecutors said was a shell company used to funnel bribe payments to her husband, the indictment states. It was one of multiple shell companies used to defraud the government, prosecutors said.

Court records filed this week do not list any attorneys for the defendants.

A spokesman at Fort Gordon did not immediately respond Thursday.”

WannaCry: Top 5 lessons learned

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Young Asian male confused and headache by WannaCry ransomware attack

Image:  “Fifth Damain Cyber”

“FIFTH DOMAIN CYBER”

“Ransomware infections are growing. There is an estimated 36 percent increase in ransomware strains per year.

Perhaps the lesson we should all learn is that global collaboration, communication and coordination is necessary to get ahead of malware infestations.

The WannaCry ransomware brought with it some unexpected consequences. It spread to an estimated 150-plus countries and impacted more than 300,000 computers. It had a substantial impact.

Recent estimates place the overall range of financial implications from $4 billion to $8 billion. Most of the impact is due to loss of productivity as well as costs associated with recovery, malware removal and re-imaging hard drives.

There were a number of lessons learned from this particular ransomware event. Here are the top five:

1. This event has many national cyber defense leaders calling for closer collaboration among countries.

2.
Rogue nation-states may resort to malware attacks to create disruption of computing capabilities that is nothing more than an annoyance.

3. 
Reuse of previously used malicious code is common, and that alone does not provide insight into who is behind the attack.

4. 
The continued use of unsupported software poses substantial risks and must be addressed in all essential/critical systems.

5. The Un factor (unknown devices and unknown patches) are sitting there waiting to be compromised and used by attackers.

Some might say we learned that paying ransom demands does not mean a system will get unlocked. That is certainly true, but has been known for several years. Maintaining an accurate technology/devices/computer asset inventory is essential to maintaining timely backups and systems’ security.

In looking at all of this, one must realize that we have known all of this for years and yet we still suffer from these attacks! One has to wonder what it will take to correct these well-known shortcomings!”

http://fifthdomain.com/2017/06/06/wannacry-top-5-lessons-learned-commentary/