Category Archives: Security

Congress Seeks Pentagon Watchdog Probe of Aircraft Parts Supplier

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Trans Digm

Image: Trans Digm

“THE PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT”

“This week, a House member called on the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) to investigate an aircraft parts supplier suspected of gouging the Pentagon for many years.

TransDigm, through the dozens of US and European aircraft part manufacturers it has bought up over the years, provides parts used on nearly every commercial and military aircraft in service today.

Representative Ro Khanna (D-CA), a member of the House Armed Services Committee, sent a letter to Acting DoD IG Glenn Fine requesting a probe into “potential waste, fraud, and abuse” by TransDigm Group, a Cleveland, Ohio-based conglomerate with a massive footprint in the aviation industry.

Most of those parts are proprietary products for which TransDigm owns the design or is the sole supplier.

Khanna is concerned that TransDigm is using its market dominance to take advantage of its customers, including DoD. Recent stories in the financial press have highlighted the company’s tendency to dramatically raise the price of parts after acquiring the manufacturer. For example, Business Insider reported that TransDigm raised the price of Harco Laboratories’ cable assembly 352 percent (from $1,737 to $7,864) after it bought the company in 2011, and two years later raised the price of Aerosonic Corporation’s vibration panel 300 percent after acquiring the company. Khanna’s letter contains other examples of similar post-acquisition price hikes.

TransDigm’s pricing practices have a direct impact on taxpayers. DoD, which accounts for roughly 30 percent of TransDigm’s sales, once paid about $5.3 million more than the fair and reasonable price for some of the company’s parts, according to a 2006 DoDIG audit.

In addition, Khanna asked the IG to look into whether TransDigm “has been operating as a hidden monopolist” by using various methods to conceal from DoD contracting officers that it is a sole-source supplier. For example, TransDigm will sometimes falsely create the appearance of a competitive bid by selling parts through other companies, known as exclusive distributors. The DoD has long known about the perils of buying parts through exclusive distributors. A 2008 IG audit advised the government to avoid this type of purchasing arrangement, warning that it “adds a duplicate layer of administration and shipments to the traditional procurement process” and prevents the government from being able to negotiate fair prices and obtain best value.

Khanna also noted that 12 TransDigm subsidiaries failed to disclose the identity of their corporate parent in the System for Award Management (SAM) contractor registration database. He reminded the IG that posting misleading or inaccurate information in SAM carries serious criminal, civil, and administrative penalties. He further noted that following publication of the inaccurate disclosure, the company amended the SAM data.

Khanna’s letter should resonate with a new president who is not shy about expressing his displeasure with wasteful defense spending. In December, then President-elect Trump took to Twitter to blast the spiraling costs of Boeing’s 747 Air Force One upgrade and Lockheed Martin’s F-35 stealth fighter, both of which use TransDigm parts.

We hope the letter puts pressure on DoD to probe TransDigm’s practices and spurs DoD and Congress to make reforms to the acquisition system. Over the years, the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) has repeatedly documented the problems in that system, which mainly boil down to rules and practices that hamstring the government’s ability to negotiate fair and reasonable prices and get the best deals for taxpayers.

POGO received the following comment from TransDigm:

TransDigm has been and remains committed to conducting business within the framework of the applicable laws and regulations across all areas and geographies in which we operate and we strongly disagree with recent allegations to the contrary. We remain steadfast in our commitment to supplying products that support the critical functions of our armed forces as well as commercial airplanes in use around the world.”

http://www.pogo.org/blog/2017/03/congress-seeks-pentagon-watchdog-probe-aircraft-parts-supplier-transdigm.html

New Army Unit -The Multi-Domain Task Force

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Army Multiple Domain Master Sgt Baumgartner, Air Force

Image: Master Sgt Baumgartner, Air Force

“The Army is creating an experimental combat unit to develop new tactics for lethally fast-paced future battlefields.

While small, it will have capabilities not found in the building block of today’s Army, the 4,000-strong brigade.

The Multi-Domain Task Force will be “a relatively small organization…1,500 or so troops,” the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, told the Future of Warfare conference here this morning.  “That organization will be capable of space, cyber, maritime, air, and ground warfare,” he said, extending its reach into all domains of military operations to support the Air Force, Navy, and Marines.

“It’s got a bunch of capabilities, and that’s what we’re going to play with to figure out what’s the right mix,” Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, the deputy chief of staff for operations (G-3/5/7), told reporters at last week’s Association of the US Army conference. “It’s got some aviation. It’s got some maneuver. It’s got signal. It’s got cyber.” In English, that means it has helicopters, infantry and/or tanks, communications troops, and technical troops to protect (and perhaps attack) computer networks. By contrast, a typical Army brigade today, a much larger formation, has maneuver and signal, but no helicopters or hackers.

The eventual goal of this experimentation may be permanent units that are so self-sufficient. The old Cold War-era Armored Cavalry Regiments had their own in-house helicopters, as well as tanks, signallers and supply to conduct reconnaissance at high speeds over large areas in the face of armed opposition. Army reformers from Doug MacGregor to H.R. McMaster, both veterans of ACRs, have seen these self-sufficient units as a potential model for future forces. The Army recently explored reviving them, but “we don’t have the stuff to build it,” in particular the helicopters, Anderson said.

“There’s still not consensus about what this thing” — the revived ACR or Reconnaissance-Strike Group — “should look like, how big it should be,” said Anderson. “That doesn’t mean we’re not going to keep striving to build that kind of capability….I think in the meantime this Multi-Domain Task Force may provide pieces, parts, of what that RSG was going to be.”

Why the drive for smaller units with a wider range of capabilities? The Army increasingly worries that big units will just be big targets. Russia and China, in particular, have developed their own smart missiles, plus the sensors to find targets and the networks to coordinate strikes. These Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) systems have the range and accuracy to potentially make wide areas of Europe and Asia — including the territory of allies like the Baltics, Poland, and South Korea — a deadly no-go zone for conventional US forces.

“There are several nations around the world who have developed very complex, very sophisticated Anti-Access/Area Denial sort of capabilities,” Milley said. “Obviously Russia and China, to a lesser extent Iran and North Korea…. That A2/AD structure is highly lethal and operating inside that structure, in large formations, will also get you killed.”

“So smaller dispersed, very agile, very nimble organizations — that are networked into other lethal systems that delivered by either air or maritime forces — will be essential to rip apart the A2/AD networks,” Milley said. “These organizations would be highly lethal, very fast, very difficult to pin down on a battlefield.”

The Army can’t maneuver this way today, emphasized Maj. Gen. Duane Gamble, the logistician heading the Europe-based 21st Theater Sustainment Command. “We don’t have the mission command capabilities that can do that. We don’t have the sustainment capabilities,” he told me at AUSA. “But where we’re getting the reps in is widely dispersed operations at the company level, sometimes at the platoon level, training with our allies, and we’re learning the vulnerabilities of our heavy formations (i.e. tank units). Their internal logistics are designed to operate in battalion sectors… So all that is informing what we need to do in the future.”

Not everyone is excited. At the AUSA conference in Huntsville, an analyst, historian and top aide to Milley’s predecessor, retired Col. David Johnson, warns we may have already overloaded Brigade Combat Team commanders with too many capabilities that once were managed by divisions or even corps. “The BCT has become the division… the focal point of just about everything. We ought to challenge that assertion,” Johnson said. “Should we keep pushing capabilities down to the BCT or relook the role of divisions and corps, and focus the brigade on the close fight?”

The head of Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Gen. David Perkins answers: “You’re (still) going to have to have echelons of command that synchronize and deconflict. That won’t change — but how those responsibilities and authorities are divided may have to. A whole generation of Army leaders grew up with Airland Battle doctrine’s clear demarcations between the close fight, conducted by short-range weapons; the deep fight, conducted by Air Force strikes, attack helicopters, and ATACMS missiles; and the supposedly safe rear area.

“A lot of it was determined by range of weapons. It was determined by physics, it was determined by geography, (e.g.) here’s a bridge crossing, who’s in charge of it?” Perkins told me at AUSA. “What we’re finding with multi-domain battle (is) that construct doesn’t work…. What’s the range of cyber?…You can’t define the battlefield framework by the range and/or limit of your weapons.”

“What we tried to do with a two-dimensional construct, AirLand Battle, was impose some order on the chaos that is battle(:) I own this part of chaos, you own this part of chaos,” Perkins said. “Now… instead of trying to control chaos, we have to thrive in it.”

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/03/new-army-unit-to-test-tactics-meet-the-multi-domain-task-force/

 

Make GWACS and IDIQ Contracts Part of Your Government Contracting Strategy

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“WASHINGTON TECHNOLOGY”  By Mark Amtower

“Government Wide Acquisition and Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity Contracts (GWACs and IDIQs)  will continue to grow, with or without you.

If you don’t have a prime spot, look for a partner company that does.

As new programs and projects will be on hold for the foreseeable future, agencies will be turning to contracts that are in place. As has been noted by Bloomberg Government and my research, GWACs and other IDIQs like OASIS have experienced significant growth over the past few years.

SEWP, the NITAAC contracts (CIO-SP3, CIO-SP3 SB, CIO-CS) and Alliant and Alliant SB each had banner years in in fisal 2016, and reports from each contract shop indicate that thus far this year there is continued growth for each vehicle. OASIS is experiencing similar growth.

The apparent downside to this is if you don’t own a prime spot on one of these contracts, you may be out of luck. While those with prime positions certainly have the edge, any company offering products or services that fall within the scope of these contracts has the opportunity to partner with a prime to gain access to these contracts.

The program managers for Alliant, SEWP and NITAAC have all stated publicly that this is a viable option, indeed, an encouraged option, for those not on one of the GWACs or other IDIQs.

There is a big upside for the small contractors already on these contracts. Partnering with other companies allows them to bid on more RFQs that come though the GWAC, thereby reaching a broader audience.

We know that the large contractors have gone after smaller contracts and task orders in recent years and this trend will continue.

To counteract this, small contractors, especially those with prime spots on the GWACs, need to aggressively seek partner companies to go after more of the task orders coming through the GWACs. When smaller contractors are successful in responding to RFQs that go through the small business side of these contracts, the more likely it is that more RFQs will follow. When fewer responses occur, the small business task order pipeline dries up.

To fully leverage GWACs and other easy-to-access (from the government buyer point of view) contracts, you need to create your own advantage, not wait for someone to level the playing field.

We know the proactive outreach on the part of the contract program managers helps grow these contracts. Joanne Woytek of SEWP makes a habit of meeting with all of her contractors. I know Bridget Gauer and her staff at NITAAC and Casey Kelley of the Alliant contract pursue a similar approach.

There are also several things contractors should be doing, including:

  • Proactive contractors on each contract have learned how to leverage these contracts. This includes knowing which agencies prefer which contracts and focusing efforts on growing that business.
  • Contractors that do their homework and develop a deeper understanding of and relationships with targeted agencies win more business from those agencies.
  • Contractors that know when to bring senior executives and other experts to certain meetings will win more business.
  • Contractors that communicate with and leverage the relationship with the GWAC/IDIQ program office always do better than those that don’t develop that relationship.
  • Contractors that develop deeper relationships with OEMs and focus on particular technologies tend to do much better than those who will sell anything to anyone.
  • Contractors partnering with carefully selected companies to respond to RFQs will likely have a higher win rate.”

About the Author

Mark Amtower

Mark Amtower advises government contractors on all facets of business-to-government (B2G) marketing and leveraging LinkedIn. Find Mark on LinkedIn at http://www.linkedin.com/in/markamtower.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NATO Agency Seeking Bids for IT Modernization Program

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NATO IT

Photo: NATO officials discuss future cyber initiatives at the NATO Communications and Information Agency. (NATO)

“NATIONAL DEFENSE MAGAZINE”

“The program will span at least four contracts and be worth up to $537 million, and is expected to be completed by mid-2018.

NATO’s communication and information technology arm is seeking industry partnerships as it takes on a multi-year modernization effort for its information-technology systems, according to the organization’s acquisition director.

The NATO Communications and Information Agency — which runs the information technology, communications and command and control for the multinational organization — has opportunities for defense and IT companies in various stages of the modernization program, Peter Scaruppe told National Defense in February.

“The IT modernization program is a very important one because it basically replaces all of the IT in all the NATO locations, and for all the NATO forces,” he said.

The program entails: streamlining NATO’s IT service offerings to increase efficiency and effectiveness; using a customer-funded delivery system to increase the flexibility and scalability of IT services; delivering services from a centralized set of locations; and implementing increased cyber security measures, according to the agency.

Next on the priorities list is introducing a cloud-based services enterprise design by this summer, which Scaruppe called a major part of the modernization program.

“Storage is an important issue for all current and future IT programs, because with big data and the availability of big data, it is increasingly important,” he said. “We are anxious to see what companies will provide.”

NCIA Agency also plans to develop new data centers in Mons, Belgium, and Lago Patria, Italy, by early 2018, Scaruppe said. A third site has not yet been publicly revealed, but is being considered as an option “if and when we need it,” he said.

“This is for the IT support and operational support for NATO locations and operations,” he said.

NCI Agency has made concerted efforts in recent years to work more closely with industry to beef up its cyber defense capabilities. The agency contracts out about 80 percent of its work to the defense and security industries of NATO’s 28 current member-nations, Scaruppe said.

This year, the agency will host its annual industry conference in North America for the first time since it kicked off six years ago, rather than in a European country, “to note the transatlantic alliance,” he said.

The theme of the NCIA Agency Industry Conference and AFCEA TechNet International — which will be held in late April in Ottawa, Canada — is “Sharpening NATO’s Technological Edge: Adaptive Partnerships and the Innovative Power of Alliance Industry.” The conference builds upon last year’s theme of why innovation is important to NATO’s technological needs, Scaruppe said.

“Especially in the IT and cyber world, we know that there are a lot of innovators out there … not exactly keen on working with an 800-pound gorilla like NATO,” he said. “Some are not familiar with the process, [so] we need to catch the right innovators.”

One major part of the conference is dedicated to innovation challenges where agency officials and industry will discuss pre-determined areas of study, he said. “We did this last year, very successfully, and we got lots of proposals, many more than we thought we would get.”

Conference attendees will learn of upcoming business opportunities with an overall budget of about $3.2 billion over the next two to three years, Scaruppe said.

Businesses also have the change to speak with agency experts ahead of potentially bidding on a project.

“We do this every year, but we’re dedicating a lot more time to this part than usual [this year],” he said, adding that the agency hopes to attract more U.S. and Canadian industry members as a result.

Attendance rates at previous conferences have been about 70 percent European-based, Scaruppe said.

The agency is also looking to attract more cyber experts through the conference by running a next-generation skills exercise and innovators program, he said.

“We have a lot more work than we have staff for — and the same is true with the private companies — [and] we want to find innovative ways of how to attract these people, how to retain these people and also keep us current in the cyber exercise.”

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=2448

 

 

 

Is Small Beautiful For The Army’s Next Generation Combat Vehicle?

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BAE 12 Ton Robot Mini tank

Image: BAE Systems

“BREAKING DEFENSE”

“There’s serious lesson here which the Army’s Next Generation Combat Vehicle effort is taking to heart.

Automation, by replacing bulky humans with compact electronics, can make for smaller combat vehicles that are not only cheaper and more fuel-efficient, but harder to hit.

The robotic war machines of the future are strangely cute. Here at the Association of the US Army winter conference, BAE Systems is showing off a 12-ton robot mini-tank that looks like a baby M1 Abrams.

Video “BAE Systems”

“The key to survival on the battlefield is not being seen,” said David Johnson, a leading scholar and former top advisor to the Chief of Army Staff. “If you saw the BAE autonomous tank… it is radically smaller than anything we have now, and smaller for a vehicle on the battlefield is a good thing.”

You don’t have to replace the entire crew to benefit, either. The Russians have long been obsessed with smaller tanks, to the point of having height limits for tank crewmen, and starting with their T-64 in the 1960s, they replaced the main gun’s human loader with a mechanical one, allowing for a smaller turret. (The M1’s designers didn’t do this because Cold War autoloaders were not only unreliable but slower than a well-trained human). Today, Russia’s new T-14 Armata tank has a completely automated turret, with the entire three-man crew in the heavily armored hull. The US Army tried a similar configuration with its cancelled Future Combat Systems, a program to build much lighter armored vehicles. BAE’s Armed Robotic Combat Vehicle mini-tank was also originally built for FCS.

Smaller vehicles have advantages for mobility as well as for survivability: They’re easier to transport to the battlefield by ship, plane, or rail, and they’re easier to keep supplied. That’s in stark contrast to the M1 Abrams, which for all its virtues gets three gallons to the mile. During the seizure of Baghdad in 2003, some M1s had to shut down their engines until a fuel convoy could push through, taking casualties on the way. The Army’s concepts for future Multi-Domain Battle envision widely dispersed units, constantly on the move to evade detection and destruction, and able to live off infrequent resupply — something that would be difficult for current heavy forces.

The Next Generation Combat Vehicle, set to enter service by 2035, would be designed to carry out those concepts, said Col. William Nuckols, director of mounted (i.e. vehicle) requirements at Fort Benning’s Maneuver Center. “This is not just about a vehicle, this is about a concept and a formation,” he said at AUSA, “the formation that we need to be able to fight the way that’s prescribed in the Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver.”

“Many of the things in the Movement and Maneuver concept do a great job of making the case for new-start combat platforms that make different trade-offs,” said Maj. Gen. David Bassett, Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat Systems. For instance, the Army has upgraded the M1 and M2 engines, he told me at the conference, and there’s more promising tech in the works — but the engine compartments on those vehicles will stay the same size they were when designed in the 1970s, putting a strict physical limit on what upgrades are possible. If you want to dramatically change fuel consumption, speed, firepower, or any other performance characteristic, you need to design a new vehicle.

So how do you build a vehicle to burn less fuel? “Fuel consumption is driven in no small way by overall vehicle weight,” Bassett said. Weight, in turn, is mainly driven by armor. Since no one’s about to develop any new magical armor material that lets us get the same protection for less weight, if you want to reduce weight, you have two choices: accept less protection — fine with unmanned vehicles, not so with humans at risk — or shrink the “volume under armor” you have to protect. Shrinking volume also makes the vehicle a smaller target.

“We are certainly keeping our aperture wide open” about what size and shape the NGCV could be, Nuckols said. In fact, he said, “we’re not certain” if NGCV will replace the M1 Abrams tank, the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicle, “or potentially both. It could be a family of vehicles.”

For a potential Bradley replacement, Nuckols said, the Army is studying both reducing the crew and reducing the number of infantry passengers. The Bradley today has a three-man crew: a driver in the hull, a commander and a gunner in the turret (its 25 mm ammunition is small enough it doesn’t need a dedicated loader). The commander’s role is to keep a 360 lookout for threats, targets, and terrain so he can direct the gunner and driver, who focus more narrowly on a given target or path. With enough assistance from sensors and artificial intelligence, however — for example, Nuckols said, “automated target acquisition” to serve as a virtual gunner — you could get down to two crew. You could also put both of them in the hull, which would allow for a smaller, cheaper turret that’s harder to hit and, if it is hit, the likely ammunition explosion doesn’t kill anyone.

To really reduce the size of the hull, however, you need to make peace with carrying fewer infantrymen. That’s painful because the raison d’être of an Infantry Fighting Vehicle is to carry infantry. The Bradley nominally carries seven, but that was with the smaller equipment loads — and smaller soldiers — of the 1980s, and even then one man had to cram into the charmingly named “hell hole.” In practice, Bradleys today manage from four to six depending on the mission.

The Army’s standard infantry squad, however, is nine men, a number the service’s analysts and tacticians swear by. The eight-wheel-drive Stryker can carry a full squad, but it’s both large and lightly armored. The cancelled Ground Combat Vehicle would also have carried nine, but putting heavy armor around that many men — plus a manned turret — pushed the vehicle’s weight north of 60 tons. So, while the Army won’t give up the nine-man squad, it’s considering splitting that squad between two (or even three) smaller vehicles.

However big they are, the manned Next Gen Combat Vehicles could well operate with completely robotic “wingmen” similar to BAE’s mini-tank, which is designed to keep up with full-sized armored vehicles. The autonomy software would have to improve. Currently, the BAE Armed Robotic Combat Vehicle can navigate from waypoint to waypoint, using its LIDAR sensors and object recognition to avoid hitting obstacles and running people over, BAE’s Jim Miller told me. For precise driving, like bringing it into the AUSA exhibit space, however, a human takes over by remote control. A human also has to remote-control the gun — no Terminators here. In fact, the ARCV’s robot brain currently doesn’t have the capacity to realize it’s under attack.

Given rapid advances in automation, however, those should be solvable problems. The Army is very interested in autonomous vehicles that could scout ahead of the manned machines or provide supporting fire alongside them. Ideally, these machines wouldn’t require one human remote operator per unmanned vehicle, but would be smart enough that a single human could supervise a whole pack of robots.

The question of control is critical. “One of the problems we have with robotics right now, Sydney, is the fact that we can’t have assured control,” Nuckols said. “Until we have that assured control… we’re going to be hesitant to replace any of our current formation capabilities with a robotic platform.”

If that’s solved, however, it opens up some radical possibilities. “There’s no guarantee that the Abrams will be replaced by a future tank,” Nuckols said. “It could conceptually be replaced by an autonomous vehicle with the lethality of an Abrams.” Equally lethal, but probably smaller — and perhaps cuter.”

http://breakingdefense.com/2017/03/is-small-beautiful-for-the-armys-next-generation-combat-vehicle/

 

 

Doing the Most with the Least – The Coast Guard Dilemma

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Lean Coast Guard

National Security Cutter Munro completed builder’s sea trials in August. HII Photo

“U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE”

“No other service over the last decade has been hit harder by budget cuts and sequestration than the U.S. Coast Guard.

In a time when our maritime services have been asked to do more with less, the Coast Guard has been engaging increased maritime threats with its leanest force in decades.

While today’s focus is being steered towards the U.S. Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment (FSA), which called for a 355-ship Navy, there has been relatively little discussion about increasing the size of the U.S. Coast Guard.

“We are depleted of resources.” Coast Guard commandant Adm. Paul Zukunft recently stated to a packed audience at the annual West 2017 conference in San Diego. “When you add both transnational criminal organizations, plus the Arctic…we need to move from being a bantam-weight fighter to being a welter-weight fighter.”

The mission requirements for the Coast Guard are mind-boggling.

Today, the Coast Guard protects and defends more than 100,000 miles of U.S. coastline and inland waterways. Additionally, it has the imposing requirement to safeguard an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) encompassing 4.5 million square miles stretching from the far reaches of the Arctic Circle to the South Pacific and from the Caribbean/Atlantic to Guam in the Western Pacific. This U.S. EEZ is a vast area that includes nine time zones and is one of the largest EEZs in the world.

Map

In President Donald Trump’s recent address to Congress, he said, “We’ve defended the borders of other nations, while leaving our own borders wide open, for anyone to cross – and for drugs to pour in at a now unprecedented rate.” The salient point here is that a majority of illegal drugs, cocaine in particular, come into this country via the maritime routes – where the drugs are in their most concentrated and in their most vulnerable form. A critical asset in the campaign to combat this illicit trade is the Coast Guard’s Legend-class National Security Cutter.

During the Surface Navy Association symposium in January, Zukunft listed the accomplishment of the crew of latest NSC cutter USCGC Hamilton (WMSL-753) that included response to Hurricane Matthew and the interdiction of more than 52,000 tons in cocaine.

A significant shortfall in the force structure of the Coast Guard fleet is the current shortage of High-Endurance Cutters. During the height of the U.S. drug interdiction efforts, the Coast Guard had a fleet of 12 Secretary-class 378-foot High-Endurance Cutters. Today, only five remain in service and the cost to maintain these 50-year old ships has become an unsustainable burden on the Coast Guard’s budget.

In 2008, to start the replacement of the aging High-Endurance Cutters, the Coast Guard commissioned the USCGC Bertholf (WMSL-750), first of the Legend class. Shortly after commissioning in 2009, Bertholf completed an extended operational deployment and exceeded all operational expectations of a “first-of-a-class” vessel.

The major concern with the current planned Coast Guard force structure is that it calls for only eight (now nine) National Security Cutters to replace 12 High-Endurance Cutters. Since the commissioning of the Hamilton-Class High-Endurance Cutters in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the maritime security landscape for our nation has changed dramatically. With the Department of Defense heavily involved overseas, the Coast Guard has taken the lead, appropriately so, in protecting and securing America’s homeland and our own backyard, as illustrated in the Commandant’s Western Hemisphere Strategy (September 2014).

US agencies stop semi-submersible, seize 12,000 pounds of cocaine

“If you look at DoD’s statement of key priorities, they are not focused on the Western Hemisphere. We have the responsibility by default and design,” Zukunft stated. Stressing the Coast Guard’s force structure deficiency to combat illegal drugs and illegal migrants in the southern approaches to the U.S., Zukunft went on to say, “The Navy’s Perry-class frigates have gone away. On the best of days, you have three Coast Guard ships in the Caribbean. That is your entire force to deal with threats in that region.”

The Coast Guard’s focus on the Western Hemisphere also includes the Arctic, as illustrated in the Commandant’s Arctic Strategy. In fact, increasing activity from cruise ships, eco-tourism, oil exploration, fishing vessels, and commercial cargo vessels seeking a shorter route between Asia and Europe have necessitated the need for the National Security Cutters to go where they never planned to go before: the unforgiving, icy waters of the Arctic.

In addition, with China’s expansion in the South China Sea and the U.S. Navy’s shortage of assets in the region, there has been discussion of the Coast Guard providing a more persistent presence in the area. The Coast Guard would be the perfect service to work with our allies in the region. If assigned, the National Security Cutter – with its 12,000-nautical-mile range and its 60-day endurance – would be the ideal ship to perform this mission.

In summary, as the new administration strives to enhance our overall national security posture, there should be serious consideration given to building at least 12 National Security Cutters to replace the 12 retiring ships in the High-Endurance Cutter program. A “one-for-one” NSC for HEC replacement strategy would better secure our nation and help the U.S. Coast Guard combat a host of emerging national security threats on multiple flanks.”

https://news.usni.org/2017/03/09/opinion-doing-the-most-with-the-least-the-coast-guard-dilemma

 

  

 

De-Complicating Federal Cyber Security

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Decompliating Cyber Security(Photo Credit: U.S. Army)

“FIFTH DOMAIN CYBER” – By Keith Lowry

When it comes down to it we’re dealing primarily with a people problem before a technical problem. People use technology to become cybersecurity and insider threats.

They also use low-tech tactics like social engineering and dumpster diving, too. Until the government realizes these concepts are connected, and that it can’t just purchase tools to address their vulnerabilities, it will always lag behind the threat.

“The nine most terrifying words in the English language are, ‘I’m from the Government, and I’m here to help.’” ~President Ronald Reagan

It might seem like hyperbole to claim that anything the government does hinders, and doesn’t help, progress. I’d like to think differently, but my experience gives President Reagan’s statement a certain level of credibility. Too many times, government agencies are convinced that doing things on a large scale will solve individual problems or issues. This attitude leads to massive delays and a lack of attention to the small but important details.

Making Simple Things Complex

During my tenure at the Pentagon, it was almost impossible to develop, coordinate, authorize and publish any policy within two years. Even if a proposed policy was extremely important, it just took too long to implement. If the Department of Defense has such issues in developing policy, then consider how difficult it must be to develop and publish policies that span across the entire spectrum of the government.

Governments inherently make simple things complex, and complicate obviously simple tasks. Because of this, I inherently question any program driven by a government agency or organization that claims it is “here to help.”

Large scale government programs are often initiated to create cost effectiveness, but what is the cost if the program takes years to develop and implement? Even worse, the fast-paced cycle of technological advances makes measuring program development in terms of years a huge problem. The opportunity costs coming from a breach or system downtime far outweigh any fiscal savings. Add in the fact that many government agencies will fight for ownership of a large program because of the concomitant funding, and you’ll see why relatively simple matters can spiral out of control very easily.

That’s not to say there isn’t a benefit in government ownership. There are potential cost savings tied to having overarching policies executed by a single entity, but the coordination and time lapse in enacting anything of value is suspect. It takes too long to enact and follow through, especially when most agencies have their own congressionally driven budget and appropriations process to consider.

A Multi-faceted Issue

Over the years, I have heard many agencies state that they cannot consider creating an insider threat program or cybersecurity program because they don’t have the budget, or that they are waiting for a parent agency to come up with a plan and associated instructions. The problem with this thought process is multi-faceted. First, no two federal organizations are alike. They all have differing processes, serve diverse populations, and also possess assorted and sundry critical value data.

Second, each of these variables means that one insider threat or cybersecurity solution doesn’t fit another organization’s needs. Finally, the budgetary and appropriations cycles are controlled by Congress, subjecting them to political realities and consequences.

In these circumstances, when I hear that the government is telling agencies what they must do while controlling the budget from afar, it’s creating a difficult problem for the agencies to solve. Furthermore, when I hear that one agency is dependent upon another to proceed in developing insider threat programs or cybersecurity solutions, it rings of the “I’m from the government, and I’m here to help,” idiom. In other words, no action will be taken in sufficient time to counter any threat.

Solving at the Highest Level

My solution for this might sound a bit controversial.

Cybersecurity threats are comingled with insider threats. At a fundamental level, too many people believe that technology alone is the answer to cybersecurity concerns. I’ve mentioned it before, it’s not just about technology. Yet that’s the first thing people think of when considering cybersecurity or insider threats. Maybe it’s thanks to Hollywood’s portrayal of the industry and the capabilities of high-powered computers connected to, well, everything.

Solving at the Highest Level

My solution for this might sound a bit controversial.

Cybersecurity threats are comingled with insider threats. At a fundamental level, too many people believe that technology alone is the answer to cybersecurity concerns. I’ve mentioned it before, it’s not just about technology. Yet that’s the first thing people think of when considering cybersecurity or insider threats. Maybe it’s thanks to Hollywood’s portrayal of the industry and the capabilities of high-powered computers connected to, well, everything.

Tactically, the government should elevate decision making for the cybersecurity/insider threat problem to a Cabinet-level position, which would signify the importance of the issue. Additionally, the Cybersecurity Cabinet person should adhere to the mantra of centralized administration, de-centralized execution. Making each agency responsible for executing its own cybersecurity and insider threat program will encourage much faster implementation countering these threats. Of course, Congress would have to be included in any solution to ensure success.

This may not be the best fiscal option, but it would certainly be the best method for quick implementation and execution required to protect government-held and controlled critical value data. Rather than one agency doing everything, make each agency responsible for creating, implementing, and running individual programs, and hold them accountable at the highest level possible.

http://fifthdomain.com/2017/03/08/de-complicating-cybersecurity-at-the-federal-level-commentary/

About the Author

Keith Lowry

Keith Lowry is the senior vice president of Nuix USG and Nuix’s Business Threat Intelligence and Analysis division. He served as chief of staff to the deputy undersecretary of defense for human intelligence, counterintelligence and security at the Pentagon, as well as an information security consultant in the private sector

 

Security Clearance Backlog Puts Contractors & DOD at Risk

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“WASHINGTON TECHNOLOGY”

“According to OMB, between February and September 2016, the backlog grew more than 22 percent from 464,000 to 569,000.

In a congressional hearing on Feb. 2, officials said the backlog was “more than half a million investigations.” All signs indicate it is still going up.

  1. The Backlog

Processing times are also too long, nearly triple the goal of 40 days for secret-level investigations (averaging 105 days) and 80 days for top secret-level investigations (214 days).

  1. Resource Shortfalls

For years, there have been too few people processing clearances and too little money to meet the demand. This affects agencies across the government, particularly those with the greatest demand. For example, when OPM raised the prepayment rate for a clearance request in 2015, Department of Defense funds to meet its pre-planned demand fell short by more than $60 million. The fiscal 2017 DOD budget request would have fixed that, but continuing resolutions made the funding shortfall worse. Civilian agencies also face funding shortfalls, though there is no readily available reliable information on their size.

  1. Antiquated Processes
Much of the backlog problem comes from using an antiquated, time-consuming background investigations process. Investigators ask basically the same questions they did 40 years ago, often going door-to-door and relying on face-to-face meetings with neighbors and friends. The government still relies too much on paper records and closed systems for collecting and sharing information.
  1. No Reciprocity

Dozens of agencies require their personnel and supporting contractors to obtain and maintain security clearances, yet these agencies fail to accept clearances from one another. At a Professional Services Council event last fall, the Justice Department alone cited at least five different required sets of background information, with DOJ agencies failing to recognize the validity of similar investigations even from within the same agency. This only exacerbates backlog problems.

  1. The OPM Data Breach

About the only area of the security clearance problem that has received plenty of attention has been the 2014 hacking of 22 million Office of Personnel Management data records. The records were so vulnerable to hacking, and government defenses so inadequate, that former Defense Policy Under Secretary Dr. Jim Miller described them as the equivalent of “leaving boxes of money on the front porch.”

However, while there has been little reporting on the OPM data breach impacts on security clearance backlogs, it is likely that government agencies have slowed their pace of activity in order to reduce their own vulnerability.

  1. Government Silence

The biggest problem of all is that the federal government simply won’t acknowledge the depth and vectors of the problems. Current data on the backlog are hard to find and harder to validate. Public statements by senior officials ignore both the magnitude of the problem and its impact on government workload and workforce. Congress has devoted little attention to the backlog, and hearings have focused more on OPM actions rather than on the backlog and its impact. Comprehensive solutions are hard to find.

Impact on the Government

New government personnel (military and civilian) cannot perform their full duties without the necessary clearances. Supporting contractors cannot fill positions requiring clearances even if they are funded under existing contracts. Essential work goes unperformed, and contractors can even be penalized for contractual non-performance by the very agencies that are holding up the clearances.

Fixing the Problems

The National Background Investigations Bureau became operational last October, and it offers some hope. NBIB aligns OPM with the Defense Information Systems Agency for a new database and more system security. NBIB also promises additional consolidation in federal investigations management and additional investigators.

But NBIB alone won’t bring the backlog down. Fixing the problems will take a serious infusion of additional people and funds, and the longer we wait, the greater the backlog will become. Most importantly, Congress must address DOD’s $60 million funding shortfall (as well as any shortfall in the civilian agencies) when the current CR expires on April 28. Congress should also raise this issue with every nominee in the affected agencies.

In the longer term, we need to make serious changes in investigations processes, including developing and applying digital tools for conducting background checks, performing ongoing updates instead of periodic reinvestigations, reducing the over-classification of material and the number of positions that require clearances, and focusing adjudication attention based on risk to the government rather than on rote application of rules. ”

https://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2017/03/02/insights-berteau-security-clearance-dangers.aspx

 

Smart Bullets for Machine Guns

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“MILITARY AND AEROSPACE ELECTRONICS”

“Think of a weapon that offers the rapid-fire capability of a machine gun with the precision independent targeting of a guided missile.

The Multi Azimuth Defense Fast Intercept Round Engagement System (MAD-FIRES) program of the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in Arlington, Va.

This project is expected to yield enabling technologies for rapidly fired smart bullets at separate targets roughly in a 180-degree half-sphere field of fire to detect swarms of manned and unmanned aircraft, fast attack boats, quickly maneuvering land vehicles, or other massed attacks.

The Raytheon Missile Systems segment in Tucson, Ariz., and the Lockheed Martin Corp. Missiles and Fire Control segment in Grand Prairie, Texas, are working on the MAD-FIRES program for DARPA. The two companies have completed concepts, simulations, and risk reduction.

Last month, DARPA scientists asked Raytheon to move the program forward to the prototype stage that is expected over the next year to test and validate MAD-FIRES technologies in realistic battlefield conditions. Lockheed Martin most likely also will take its MAD-FIRES work into the prototype stage.

The most promising and immediate potential application for MAD-FIRES technology is for the Bushmaster MK 38 25-millimeter deck gun aboard U.S. Navy destroyers and other surface warships for defending against small, fast, and agile surface threats.

A 25-millimeter bullet is about six inches long and nearly an inch in diameter. Each bullet can have a high-explosive or armor-piercing penetrator for use against vehicles, personnel, light fortifications, or similar targets. The MK 38 can fire these bullets at rates between 200 and 500 rounds per minute. It can cause a lot of damage.

Now consider if each of those 200 to 500 rounds per minute could be directed at a separate target, with the ability to change its trajectory in flight to avoid attempts at evasion. Even large combined swarms of fast attack boats, manned aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) bearing down on a Navy surface ship would have little chance at survival, much less of damaging the ship.

The 25-millimeter auto cannon, moreover, isn’t limited just to Navy surface warships. The M242 Bushmaster, on which the MK 38 deck gun is based, also can be fitted to armored combat vehicles like the M2 Bradley.

It’s reasonable to guess that MAD-FIRES-equipped machine guns also could be fitted to fighter and land-attack aircraft, fast and light military vehicles such as the Army Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), special operations boats, and other military platforms.

Medium-caliber machine guns with independently targeted smart bullets could be coming to a variety of military platforms perhaps as early as over the next decade.”

 

http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2017/01/machine-guns-smart-bullets.html

Defense Acquisition Requires Simplicity, Collaboration

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“NATIONAL DEFENSE MAGAZINE’

“The organization and function of the Defense Department is so antiquated that it may well prove unable to deliver the changes that the nation needs.

So, even as it focuses on potentially existential threats to the nation, somebody must address the conversion of the “horse and buggy,” which is the present-day Pentagon, to make it perform like a modern turbocharged vehicle.

The challenges are many, but if there is focus on simplicity the department could be improved while dramatically reducing the problems faced by small contractors. The payoff for even modest improvement could be felt most by the smaller contractors, as they are most at risk under the current system. The focus should be to enlarge and modernize commercial interaction done by the department to make it less adversarial, more collaborative, transparent, accountable and sensitive to business cash flow needs.

There is a remarkable asymmetry between the government and industry with respect to fundamental contractual and administrative execution.

The first problem is one of predictable communication and consistent government performance. As an example, when processing a government contract for a simple procurement action inexplicably takes nine months versus the three months promised, the impact at the company level is complex and potentially devastating. This problem is exacerbated when the contracting entity does not provide any communication regarding revised performance timelines. Delays such as these put small businesses in a no-win position. Many businesses live in a world without adequate cash flow and little to no backlog. So, in this situation, waiting until contract award means that long-long lead production items from the manufacturing base will not be on hand when work should start. Production lines that go dormant do not come back to life easily or quickly. Workers trained and available today can’t be stored on dry ice for the six month delay; they are either laid off or employed elsewhere.

So, for many small firms in this situation, there is no choice but to take risk and begin committing precious resources on an un-awarded contract. This in turn intensifies the dependency of the small contractor on the government who now truly controls their fate.

The government must establish and live with reasonable performance standards and timelines. When it fails to do so, it should pay compensation promptly, just as the contractor is now required to pay “consideration” when he/she fails to meet government performance standards.

When both sides have leverage on the other it will drive improved communication and partnership. Presently the burden is entirely one-sided and gives the department unfair power.

In the current calculus people don’t count — either inside or outside of government. The Defense Department should institute modern relationship metrics to measure how individual teams align to their respective missions.

Major consulting firms with international portfolios such as Gallup and Korn-Ferry assist Fortune 500 firms in executing individual employee surveys measuring internal engagement, leadership and performance annually. The first year results of such a survey done on the department’s corporate structure — to distinguish it from the operational force — would probably stun its leaders. They would be given the opportunity to confront the reality that organizational alignment, leadership, teamwork, sharing and collaboration are all capable of major improvement when compared with global norms for like-sized entities. Gathering these results on an annual basis will afford defense leaders the opportunity to evaluate leadership development programs, workforce business processes, software and a host of other factors directly relevant to improving performance. Probably as important as anything, leaders who cannot accept candid feedback on issues will be forced to confront the reality that they must either embrace the input or leave.

In a parallel initiative, there needs to be lateral entry from business to government service at the mid-tier levels. This would bring an infusion of additional talent to a limited entry profession and augment the experience and knowledge base in the bureaucracy.

In addition to internal feedback, there must be measurement of relationships with contractors. The contracting process has to be made more collaborative and timely. A lot can be learned by comparing the business experience of two recent contracting processes. One was a standard government request for proposals to make a $80,000 piece of utility equipment for delivery over a 10-year period. The other was a commercial RFP for a similarly priced comparable item for multiple-year performance. Both were competitive contract awards with multiple competitors. The differences between the two processes could not have been more obvious. The defense-related RFP was 70 pages; the commercial RFP was 27 pages. The commercial RFP was readable and straightforward; the other was complex and contained endless references to additional government standards. The commercial RFP encouraged innovation by outlining desired characteristics and inviting new approaches, the other set specific standards for performance.

The commercial process encouraged continuous dialogue and explanation of performance priorities while the DoD process was terse and regulated by legalistic formality. The dialogue with the commercial partner enabled the prospective partner to educate its customer on new and evolving technology and materials. The government’s enforced silence did nothing to generate shared understanding. But most importantly, the commercial process timeline from initiating contracting action through prototype production was 10 months whereas the government’s was two years.

In a world where collaboration and speed are essential to success, the antiquated government process is increasingly costly and inefficient.

The process of transforming major enterprises and complex relationships requires courage and persistence. The difficulty of implementing change in an organization as large as the Defense Department should not be the argument for failing to start. It is already one or two decades behind leading-edge commercial businesses and is falling further behind.

Nothing recommended above is new, revolutionary or suspect — it’s just good practice.”

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2017/March/Pages/DefenseAcquisitionRequiresSimplicityCollaboration.aspx